

Administrative - Internal USC (URG)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : F. W. M. Janney  
Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : NFAC Management Advisory Group Proposal to Establish  
an Intelligence Specialist Corps within NFAC

REFERENCE : Memo for DCI fr NFAC MAG dtd 6 Jun 78, subject:  
Creation of an Intelligence Specialist Corps  
within NFAC

1. I have had an opportunity to review the proposal contained in the reference memorandum and offer the following comments for your consideration.

The concept of high-graded analysts with no supervisory responsibilities was established in the 1960's. The NFAC MAG is proposing to enlarge the concept in numbers and more formally institutionalize it by creating an "Intelligence Specialist Corps."

We have no problem with the concept of senior analysts. To increase the numbers, however, MAG would convert supervisory slots, for example, GS-15 Branch Chiefs to GS-14, and allocate senior analyst slots within NFAC by the size of the Office.

The Agency is not exempt from the principle of "equal pay for substantially equal work," Title V, U.S.C., Sec. 5301, Pay Comparability Systems Principle, nor the Job Evaluation Policy Act of 1970 which provides a common approach for the evaluation of positions. Each position is classified on the basis of some nine common factors, ranging from knowledge required to span of authority and, where pertinent, supervisory responsibility is added. The complexity of each factor can be converted to a point scale which in the aggregate determines the grade. To assign a lower grade to a Branch Chief classified at GS-15 without diminishing the importance in one or more factors would quite simply violate the principle of "equal pay for equal work."

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The same is true at the supergrade level only more so because of the finite ceiling imposed. The ceiling on Agency supergrades [ ] positions classified at that level. An increase in the on-duty number of supergrade analysts means a decrease in the number who are currently paid at that level as a result of determining the aggregate responsibility-point-count of the position. The principles involved preclude simply converting established supergrade positions whether non-supervisory staff in an office or the NFAC Front Office or Deputy Division or Division Chief. The classification of each position is determined by the content of the position. While we can look at a newly designated position and determine that it is in fact at the GS-16 level, we can today only pay [ ] employees at the supergrade rate.

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The organizational structure of NFAC is established with a number of managerial positions and staff positions at supergrade levels. Our way to extract supergrade ceiling for analytical positions would be to telescope the current structure by melding existing Divisions and/or Offices.

2. It is of particular relevance to keep in mind current House Appropriations Committee inquiries and review of our supergrade requirements and the importance of our ability to justify these requirements to the HAC and OMB based on accepted position classification methodology that promotes "equal pay for substantially equal work." In the past our position classification system has stood the test of external review and, in effect, has provided the basis for defending our grade structure when it has been questioned. I am concerned that the NFAC MAG method of allocating supergrade positions based on organizational strength would cause internal position grade inequities as well as increased concern for various external review organizations. I believe our classification system can continue to accommodate senior grade levels for non-supervisory analysts where the position requirement can justify the higher grade.

3. In conclusion, it is essential to protect the Director and the Agency with a viable and consistent job classification methodology for all Agency supergrade positions in order to minimize external criticism and to provide a sound basis for external justification of new supergrade requirements.

[Signature]

F. W. M. Janney

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Revised: D/Pers/FWMJanney:jmk (4 Aug 78)

FMAG

6 June 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

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FROM : [REDACTED]  
Chairman, NFAC Management Advisory GroupSUBJECT : Creation of an Intelligence Specialist Corps  
within NFAC

In response to your request at our 15 March meeting, this memorandum presents an elaboration of the MAG proposal to create an "intelligence specialist" or "senior analyst" corps within NFAC. We also submit suggestions for converting some NFAC managerial slots to senior analyst slots and for a career development program.

The NFAC MAG believes that greater specialization and more depth in analysis can best be fostered in NFAC by creating a cadre of analysts who are isolated from managerial pressures. Efforts have been made in the past, and a new drive is currently underway, to identify some slots for supergrade analysts. Much as we approve, we doubt this will provide more than a temporary solution, given the constant pressures on higher graded analysts to take on supervisory responsibility or to assume "non-supervisory" staff positions.

The NFAC MAG believes that the establishment of a distinct cadre of intelligence specialists provides the best, and perhaps the only, effective buffer against such pressures.\* A commitment to reserve a specified number of senior positions for intelligence specialists should prove a major asset in attracting highly qualified personnel--both through lateral entry and regular recruitment channels. Moreover, it would facilitate the retention of first-rate

\*See table 1 for a graphic demonstration of how many Non-supervisory positions (as defined by the Office of Personnel) now are filled by analysts performing essentially staff functions. For the purposes of our paper, an "analyst" is defined as one who spends more than half of his or her time involved in original research and writing. A breakdown by grade of the number of supervisory, non-supervisory, and "analytical" positions found in the largest NFAC offices appears in the Annex.

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analysts in the Center by ensuring a more favorable working environment and by providing stronger incentives to develop their analytical skills.

The strengthening of analytical and managerial training would be essential to the success of this system. At present, NFAC's training programs are insufficient to foster excellence in analysis or management. With a stronger training program, all analysts at lower grade levels should be encouraged to develop and improve analytical and managerial skills through on-the-job training courses from the Office of Training, academic instruction and professional meetings. Some foreign travel and rotational assignments in other parts of the Center and the Intelligence Community would also be useful. Academic sabbaticals and extended foreign study should be strongly encouraged for those opting for an analytical career. Analysts who opt to take on managerial responsibilities as well should receive advanced training in administration and personnel management.

The NFAC MAG Proposal in Brief


The NFAC MAG recommends that one GS-17 slot, three GS-16 slots, and about ten GS-15 slots be designated as intelligence specialist positions in each of the four largest production offices--OER, OSR, OWI, and ORPA.\* OSI and OGCR respectively would receive fewer intelligence specialist positions, the former because of its smaller size, the latter because of its internal structure. (NFAC offices with a lower overall grade structure could opt for some GS-14 and GS-13 positions.)

The designation of one GS-17 and three GS-16 intelligence specialist positions in each of the larger offices is based on a calculation of how many slots could be converted at each grade level without requiring more slots at that level within NFAC. For the GS-15 positions in the larger offices we allotted one GS-15 slot for each division or major component within an office or one GS-15 slot for every two branches, whichever number was greater.\*\*

\* See Table 2 for a detailed breakdown of how many intelligence specialist positions would be generated for each office. The inclusion of some GS-14 intelligence specialist positions would be optional.

\*\*If the system were extended to the GS-14 level, one GS-14 position would be allotted to every branch or two GS-14 positions for every division, whichever number was greater.

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Implementing the Proposal

The NFAC MAG proposal can be implemented without increasing the average grade in NFAC or the number of slots at any given grade level. In order to accomplish this objective, difference procedures are required at each grade level:

GS-15. The NFAC MAG is proposing the establishment of 67 GS-15 intelligence specialist positions. All but one could be created by designating existing GS-15 non-supervisory slots to this category. A close look at the functions performed by GS-15s now in these slots reveals, however, that about one third are filled by personnel who perform mostly staff functions. As most of these staff positions probably should be retained, another method for generating the recommended number of GS-15 intelligence specialist positions is required.

The NFAC MAG is proposing that at least half of the GS-15 non-supervisory slots be designated as intelligence specialist positions and that the remainder be obtained by converting a limited number of GS-15 supervisory slots now reserved for branch chiefs. In the major production offices all branch chiefs are currently slotted at the GS-15 level. Our recommendation of about ten GS-15 intelligence specialists in each of those offices could be met by converting a small number of branch chief slots in each office. If he so desired, an office chief could, however, create more intelligence specialist positions by converting other branch chief slots to this category.

Responsibility for determining which divisions would be allotted the GS-14 branch chief slots would rest in the front office. The office director would also determine how these slots would be reallocated as requirements change both within the office and in the various divisions. Although ORPA could meet its "quota" simply by designating about half of its current non-supervisory GS-15 slots as intelligence specialists, the NFAC MAG recommends that it also adopt the flexible GS-15/GS-14 grading structure for branch chiefs given the advantages that otherwise would accrue. (See discussion on page 4.)

GS-16. In order to generate the proposed number of GS-16 intelligence specialist positions, a variety of procedures are possible. (The total number of positions that could be generated by each procedure is given in parentheses.)

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- Designate recently created GS-16 non-supervisory slots as GS-16 intelligence specialists (?)
- Convert GS-16 non-supervisory "staff" positions within an office (2)
- Convert GS-16 non-supervisory staff positions in the NFAC front office including the NIO's (11)
- Convert GS-16 deputy division chief slots (8)
- Convert GS-16 division chief slots (15)

Most of the GS-16 intelligence specialist positions could be generated by converting deputy division chief slots or by converting staff slots in the NFAC front office, particularly in those cases where a GS-16 position is slotted under a National Intelligence Officer who has been assigned two deputies. Each office would doubtless employ a different set of procedures depending on its "resources."

GS-17. These positions most likely would be generated by converting existing GS-17 supervisory slots within an office. We recommend against using positions now filled under the Scientific Pay Schedule to fill these slots.

In most instances where a slot is "converted," office chiefs probably would opt to retain that position by slotting it at the next lowest grade level. All responsibility for allocating the newly defined analytical and managerial slots to the various divisions within an office would rest in the front office.

#### How the System Would Operate

The establishment of an intelligence specialist corps would have little impact on the career of an analyst up to the GS-13 level. The analyst should be exposed to both the substantive and the managerial facets of working in the Center and should be encouraged to develop and improve analytical and managerial skills.

At the GS-14 level, an analyst would begin to express interest in pursuing an analytical career. The analyst would actively seek unique opportunities to develop his or her analytical

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skills as they became available. Although chances for promotion would be somewhat reduced by going this route, limited opportunities to advance up to the supergrade level would still exist.

The establishment of a more flexible grading structure for branch chiefs would also provide more opportunities for GS-13/GS-14 analysts who aspire to managerial positions. Office chiefs could use the "junior branch chief slot" as a testing ground for new managers, periodically rotating analysts who had shown some potential as managers into such slots.

Analysts who decided against being managers or who failed to perform adequately during their "trial" period would have greater incentive to rejoin the analytical ranks where there would still be potential for advancement. In such cases the front office would also be spared from tying down a GS-15 slot or committing itself to a promotion before discovering that the analyst was a bad manager.

A branch chief who is slotted at the GS-14 level would not be expected to have as strong an analytical background as branch chiefs slotted at the GS-15 level. "Junior" branch chiefs who demonstrated analytical growth and strong potential as managers, however, would become candidates for GS-15 branch chief slots and could be promoted to that position as soon as a GS-15 managerial slot opened up in the office.

It would be useful if an office could rotate a GS-15 manager into an intelligence specialist position for a limited time to do a project. Although such practice probably would be the exception rather than the rule, it could give office directors much more flexibility in the management of their analytical resources. At the GS-15 level and higher, an analyst should have made his or her career choice. Movement from the analytical cadre into a management position would be discouraged and movement in the opposite direction should be rare.

To qualify for a position as a GS-15 intelligence specialist, the analyst should be a recognized expert in his or her field and a master of the skills required to do the job.


A GS-16 intelligence specialist should be a recognized expert not only within the Intelligence Community but within academic and other professional circles as well. The analyst should possess special skills for intelligence production in areas of high concern to the Intelligence Community. A GS-16 intelligence specialist should be fluent in all languages relating to his or her

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specialty, and have done at least a year of field research  
(preferably Center sponsored).

A GS-17 intelligence specialist would in most cases serve  
as the director of an analytical center within his or her office.  
A number of senior intelligence specialists probably would be  
assigned to the center. Not only would he or she have all the  
qualifications listed for a GS-16 intelligence specialist, but  
also the capability of assuming some supervisory responsibility.



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ANNEX

Breakdown for OER  
Breakdown for OWI  
Breakdown for OSR  
Breakdown for ORPA  
Breakdown for OSI  
Breakdown for OGCR  
Breakdown for OIA  
Breakdown for OCR  
Breakdown for CRG  
Breakdown for NFAC Front Office  
Total NFAC Breakdown  
Total for OER, OWI, OSR, ORPA, and OSI

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